Ethiopia has refused to reverse its decision to withdraw its forces from Somalia by the end of the year, despite a plea from the African Union (AU) to delay the move which it fears may result in a security vacuum inside the country.
The government in Addis Ababa said last month that it would pull its troops out by the scheduled time amid fears the war-torn country could descend into further anarchy unless more peacekeepers are sent.
"We appeal to Ethiopia to consider phasing out withdrawal, until such time [when] more troops from Nigeria, Uganda and Burundi are deployed in Somalia," the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the AU said in a statement at a meeting in the Ethiopian capital on Monday.
"The security situation in Somalia is alarming ... piracy is escalating against the background of weakening leadership and insurgents control nearly all the country with the exception of Mogadishu and Baidoa."
There are currently some 3,000 Ethiopian troops in Somalia supporting the embattled Transitional Federal Government [TFG], which is based in the southern town of Baidoa.
A further 3,400 peacekeepers from Uganda and Burundi make up the AU mission in the country.
That number is well below the 8,000 troops pledged by the AU two years ago.
But despite the shortfall Ethiopian officials said the pullout of their forces would go ahead.
"The decision to withdraw troops from Somalia was a commitment made by the country's authorities to parliament and will not be changed," said Tekeda Alemu, Ethiopia's minister of state.
About 850 Nigerian troops are expected to join the AU peacekeepers already stationed in the country.
Rift
Adding to the fragility of Somalia's TFG government is a growing rift between Abdullahi Yusuf, the president, and Nur Hassan Hussein, the man he sacked as prime minister.
The AU and the US government have backed Hussein and have so far refused to recognise Mohamud Mohamed Guled, the new Somali prime minister, who was selected by the president.
The TFG is also facing an escalation in attacks from opposition fighters, that threatens to reach Mogadishu, the capital.
Fighters from al-Shabab, a group which split from the armed Union of Islamic Courts (UIC), have control of several town and cities across Somalia.
The opposition controls the south of Somalia and has launched a series of raids on Ethiopian forces which have tried to defend the government.
At least 10,000 civilians have been killed in two years of fighting, while a million people have been forced to flee their homes.
Via Al Jazeera.
Comment:
Ever since the Ethiopian invasion (and indeed beginning prior to it), the remnants of the Islamic Courts Union have been becoming increasingly radicalized; this is particularly true of the successor/splinter group Al-Shabaab. Although I used to be very well informed on the situation in Somalia, I more or less gave up on it in disgust two years ago when Ethiopia invaded, and am therefore unsure how (or if) this will affect the War on Terror. I'm going to see if I can contact James Dahl, the online community's foremost expert on the matter, to see what his take on it is.
Showing posts with label insurgency. Show all posts
Showing posts with label insurgency. Show all posts
Tuesday, December 23, 2008
Sunday, October 12, 2008
We gain one, we lose one.
There's a lot to talk about today, so I'm going to depart from my usual format.
According to Al Jazeera:
Although I was somewhat disappointed to learn that there had been a district that I had not known was held by the Taliban, this is of course good news, as is the news, also reported in the article, that NATO had repulsed a major attack on Lashkar Gah. However, AJ did not mention this somewhat less cheerful development, which I found out about via Quqnoos:
The situation in Nuristan has been growing increasingly worrying. According to my current map prototype, the Taliban currently controls three of its eight districts, as well as the Dara-ye Pech District just across the border in Kunar Province, and a fourth district, Bargomatal, was attacked by Tehrik-i-Taliban-i-Pakistan back in July. I still have been unable to determine the outcome of that battle, but am inclined to think that, even if the TTP did manage to take it, which I don't think they did, their forces have since been withdrawn to fight the Pakistani security forces in Bajaur, which would leave the district only nominally in the Taliban's hands, just as so much of the rest of the province is only nominally in the hands of NATO and the central government. I have seen reports that some of the forces currently fighting in Bajaur had previously been fighting in Afghanistan, which lends some credence to this theory.
Nuristan, for those of you who are not familiar with it (i.e. pretty much all of you), is one of the most isolated inhabited regions on the face of the Earth. Its terrain is nearly impassable, and it is so out of the way that Islam didn't reach it until the end of the 19th century. Before then it was known as Kafiristan (land of the unbelievers) and its inhabitants as the Red Kafirs; their cousins, the Black Kafirs, or Kalasha, live on the Pakistani side of the Durand line and still practice their age-old pagan religion. The Nuristanis speak languages that are unusual even for Mianistan; while most languages in the region are either Iranian (e.g. Pashto, Wakhi, Yidgha) or Indo-Aryan (e.g. Khowar, Kalasha, Torwali) (although this "Dardic" sub-group of the Indo-Aryan branch is pretty weird), the Nuristani languages form a group all of their own.
There is, however, yet another major development regarding Afghanistan in the news today. Quqnoos reports:
This is a superb idea. Working with the tribes worked in Iraq, is working in Pakistan, and, unlike McCain's bizarre idea to "clear and hold" some of the most impassible terrain on Earth, it would also work in Afghanistan. In case you haven't noticed, I am strongly pro-tribe, not only because of my own tribal identity (Stewart of Bote FTW!), but also simply because it works. Indeed, in regions such as Mianistan I would venture to say that it is the only strategy that will work. My friend Woke at News Hounds has often said that it is impossible for a conventional army to defeat a popular insurgency. Although it is possible to do it if you brutally punish the civilian population, as Genghis Khan did, that's not really an option if you're the good guys, so it's true so far as we are concerned. This means that if you are faced with an insurgency, the only way that you can win is if it stops being popular. The psychopathic, woman-oppressing, elder-beheading Taliban are already helping us out on this one. However, their antisocial ways can be counteracted by the collateral damage we often inflict when we fight them directly. This means that there needs to be a popular insurgency against the unpopular one. We can then support the locals rather than killing them. And in the tribal reality of Mianistan, supporting the locals means supporting the tribes.
According to Al Jazeera:
In a second battle in Helmand province, Afghan and international troops retook the Nad Ali district centre - which had been held by fighters - during a three-day fight, Ahmadi said.
That battle, which also involved airstrikes, ended on Saturday and resulted in the death of 40 Taliban fighters, officials said.
Afghan police and soldiers were now in control of the district centre.
Nato said its aircraft bombed fighters after they were seen gathering for a major attack, killing "multiple enemy forces".
"If the fighters planned a spectacular attack prior to the winter, this was a spectacular failure," Richard Blanchette, an Isaf spokesman, said.
Although I was somewhat disappointed to learn that there had been a district that I had not known was held by the Taliban, this is of course good news, as is the news, also reported in the article, that NATO had repulsed a major attack on Lashkar Gah. However, AJ did not mention this somewhat less cheerful development, which I found out about via Quqnoos:
Taliban claim to have forced NATO-led troops from a remote district
THE NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) has withdrawn from a district in the north-eastern province of Nuristan, the international force said.
ISAF said it retreated from its forward operating base in the Kamdish district on Friday following advice from Afghanistan’s Defence Ministry.
But the Taliban claimed that it forced ISAF troops in the district to retreat after engaging them in fierce fighting in the district, one of the country’s most insecure.
The situation in Nuristan has been growing increasingly worrying. According to my current map prototype, the Taliban currently controls three of its eight districts, as well as the Dara-ye Pech District just across the border in Kunar Province, and a fourth district, Bargomatal, was attacked by Tehrik-i-Taliban-i-Pakistan back in July. I still have been unable to determine the outcome of that battle, but am inclined to think that, even if the TTP did manage to take it, which I don't think they did, their forces have since been withdrawn to fight the Pakistani security forces in Bajaur, which would leave the district only nominally in the Taliban's hands, just as so much of the rest of the province is only nominally in the hands of NATO and the central government. I have seen reports that some of the forces currently fighting in Bajaur had previously been fighting in Afghanistan, which lends some credence to this theory.
Nuristan, for those of you who are not familiar with it (i.e. pretty much all of you), is one of the most isolated inhabited regions on the face of the Earth. Its terrain is nearly impassable, and it is so out of the way that Islam didn't reach it until the end of the 19th century. Before then it was known as Kafiristan (land of the unbelievers) and its inhabitants as the Red Kafirs; their cousins, the Black Kafirs, or Kalasha, live on the Pakistani side of the Durand line and still practice their age-old pagan religion. The Nuristanis speak languages that are unusual even for Mianistan; while most languages in the region are either Iranian (e.g. Pashto, Wakhi, Yidgha) or Indo-Aryan (e.g. Khowar, Kalasha, Torwali) (although this "Dardic" sub-group of the Indo-Aryan branch is pretty weird), the Nuristani languages form a group all of their own.
There is, however, yet another major development regarding Afghanistan in the news today. Quqnoos reports:
US wants to reduce dependence on government by arming militias
THE UNITED States plans to arm tribal militias against the Taliban, US Defence Secretary Robert Gates said at a NATO summit in Hungary.
As part of a plan to create greater co-operation on both sides of the Afghan-Pakistani border, the US wants to train tribal militias in an attempt to reduce its dependence on the central government in Kabul.
Parliament members had already suggested arming the tribes, but the idea was not given any currency at the time.
This is a superb idea. Working with the tribes worked in Iraq, is working in Pakistan, and, unlike McCain's bizarre idea to "clear and hold" some of the most impassible terrain on Earth, it would also work in Afghanistan. In case you haven't noticed, I am strongly pro-tribe, not only because of my own tribal identity (Stewart of Bote FTW!), but also simply because it works. Indeed, in regions such as Mianistan I would venture to say that it is the only strategy that will work. My friend Woke at News Hounds has often said that it is impossible for a conventional army to defeat a popular insurgency. Although it is possible to do it if you brutally punish the civilian population, as Genghis Khan did, that's not really an option if you're the good guys, so it's true so far as we are concerned. This means that if you are faced with an insurgency, the only way that you can win is if it stops being popular. The psychopathic, woman-oppressing, elder-beheading Taliban are already helping us out on this one. However, their antisocial ways can be counteracted by the collateral damage we often inflict when we fight them directly. This means that there needs to be a popular insurgency against the unpopular one. We can then support the locals rather than killing them. And in the tribal reality of Mianistan, supporting the locals means supporting the tribes.
Friday, May 30, 2008
Iraqis rally over US security deal
Tens of thousands of Iraqi Shia have taken to the streets of Baghdad and other cities to protest against a long-term security deal with the US. The rallies after Friday prayers follow a call by Muqtada al-Sadr for weekly protests against the deal that could lead to more US troops and a long-term US presence.
Washington wants the Iraqi government to provide a legal framework for US troops to remain in Iraq beyond the expiration of a UN mandate in December. Officials from the administration of George Bush, the US president, told Al Jazeera they expect to finalise the deal by the end of July.
A statement from al-Sadr's office called the negotiations "a project of humiliation for the Iraqi people".
Sheikh Salah Obaidi, a spokesman for al-Sadr's bloc in parliament, said the call for protests is not a "threat" to the Iraqi government, but a "warning". Al-Sadr, a Shia leader who has the backing of the al-Mahdi Army militia, called for the weekly protests on Tuesday and warned the government against signing the agreement, saying "it is against the interests of the Iraqi people".
Abdul-Aziz al-Hakim, another leading Shia figure, spoke out against the agreement, saying it would violate Iraq's sovereignty.
Last week, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, Iraq's most revered Shia cleric, also reportedly expressed his anger, saying he would not permit the Iraqi government to sign a deal with "US occupiers" as long as he lived.
Via Al Jezeera.
Comment:
Why is the Bush administration so averse to victory? Once we finally reduce al-Qaeda in Iraq to utter insignificance — and I would be absolutely flabbergasted if that still had not happened by the time the mandate expires in December — our job will be complete. We will be able to withdraw; when we do so, the attacks against our troops will obviously stop, and Iraq will have become as stable as can reasonably be expected for a country in the Middle East. If, however, we do make this deal, then the current fragile peace that exists between the government and the Shia (and, most likely, the Sunni as well) will be broken. If we make the deal, we will have needed to make it; if we do not make it, we will not have needed to make it.
We must withdraw, not only for Iraq, but for us as well. I have calculated that by freeing up all of the troops who are currently deployed in Iraq, and allowing them sufficient time between deployments, we would be able to triple, if not outright quadruple, the size of the Coalition forces in Afghanistan. President Obama will then be able to show Bush what a real surge looks like.
Washington wants the Iraqi government to provide a legal framework for US troops to remain in Iraq beyond the expiration of a UN mandate in December. Officials from the administration of George Bush, the US president, told Al Jazeera they expect to finalise the deal by the end of July.
A statement from al-Sadr's office called the negotiations "a project of humiliation for the Iraqi people".
Sheikh Salah Obaidi, a spokesman for al-Sadr's bloc in parliament, said the call for protests is not a "threat" to the Iraqi government, but a "warning". Al-Sadr, a Shia leader who has the backing of the al-Mahdi Army militia, called for the weekly protests on Tuesday and warned the government against signing the agreement, saying "it is against the interests of the Iraqi people".
Abdul-Aziz al-Hakim, another leading Shia figure, spoke out against the agreement, saying it would violate Iraq's sovereignty.
Last week, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, Iraq's most revered Shia cleric, also reportedly expressed his anger, saying he would not permit the Iraqi government to sign a deal with "US occupiers" as long as he lived.
Via Al Jezeera.
Comment:
Why is the Bush administration so averse to victory? Once we finally reduce al-Qaeda in Iraq to utter insignificance — and I would be absolutely flabbergasted if that still had not happened by the time the mandate expires in December — our job will be complete. We will be able to withdraw; when we do so, the attacks against our troops will obviously stop, and Iraq will have become as stable as can reasonably be expected for a country in the Middle East. If, however, we do make this deal, then the current fragile peace that exists between the government and the Shia (and, most likely, the Sunni as well) will be broken. If we make the deal, we will have needed to make it; if we do not make it, we will not have needed to make it.
We must withdraw, not only for Iraq, but for us as well. I have calculated that by freeing up all of the troops who are currently deployed in Iraq, and allowing them sufficient time between deployments, we would be able to triple, if not outright quadruple, the size of the Coalition forces in Afghanistan. President Obama will then be able to show Bush what a real surge looks like.
Friday, November 16, 2007
US-Iraqi assault 'targets al-Qaeda'
Reports from Iraq say 600 US and Iraqi soldiers have launched an air and ground assault on two villages allegedly sheltering al-Qaeda in Iraq fighters. The soldiers are reported to be searching villagers' homes to try to flush out al-Qaeda fighters hiding among them....
Meanwhile, a top British commander in southern Iraq said attacks plunged 90 per cent across the country's south after the UK withdrew its troops from the city of Basra. The presence of British forces in the centre of Basra, Iraq's second-largest city, was the single largest instigator of violence, Major-General Graham Binns said on Thursday on a visit to Baghdad's Green Zone. About 500 British troops moved out of a former Saddam Hussein palace at Basra's heart in early September, joining some 4,500 at a garrison at an airport on the city's edge.
[More]
Comment:
Holy cow. Ninety percent.
One of the most important parts of winning the War on Terror is resolving the situation in Iraq. Even though al-Qaeda's plans for establishing an emirate in that country have all but collapsed, the ongoing occupation is still one of their best recruiting tools, generating anger and outrage throughout the Middle East — and the world — that the Apostasy feeds on. The problem, of course, is how to end it; you can't just wave a magic wand and create a stable society. Due to the weakness and ineffectiveness of the central Iraqi government, conventional wisdom has been that simply pulling our troops out would result in a power vacuum, causing Iraq to implode in much the way Somalia did. It now appears, however, that for whatever reason this is not the case.
Clearly, more information is required than is provided in this one article. Is the unexpected stability due to increased effectiveness of the Iraqi government, or is it due to its absence and the dominion of a few groups that are acting as mini governments? If it's the later there's a problem, because it means that a general withdrawal would end up splitting Iraq into warring regions, internally stable but in bloody conflict with one another. In addition to the obvious undesirability of this for the people of Iraq, it also would not help much in the War on Terrorism, since al-Qaeda recruiters would be able to point to the corpse of what was once a functional nation and say, "America did this". Another question is what the crime rate is like in Basrah. Few military attacks won't mean much if the region is reduced to mob rule.
Meanwhile, a top British commander in southern Iraq said attacks plunged 90 per cent across the country's south after the UK withdrew its troops from the city of Basra. The presence of British forces in the centre of Basra, Iraq's second-largest city, was the single largest instigator of violence, Major-General Graham Binns said on Thursday on a visit to Baghdad's Green Zone. About 500 British troops moved out of a former Saddam Hussein palace at Basra's heart in early September, joining some 4,500 at a garrison at an airport on the city's edge.
[More]
Comment:
Holy cow. Ninety percent.
One of the most important parts of winning the War on Terror is resolving the situation in Iraq. Even though al-Qaeda's plans for establishing an emirate in that country have all but collapsed, the ongoing occupation is still one of their best recruiting tools, generating anger and outrage throughout the Middle East — and the world — that the Apostasy feeds on. The problem, of course, is how to end it; you can't just wave a magic wand and create a stable society. Due to the weakness and ineffectiveness of the central Iraqi government, conventional wisdom has been that simply pulling our troops out would result in a power vacuum, causing Iraq to implode in much the way Somalia did. It now appears, however, that for whatever reason this is not the case.
Clearly, more information is required than is provided in this one article. Is the unexpected stability due to increased effectiveness of the Iraqi government, or is it due to its absence and the dominion of a few groups that are acting as mini governments? If it's the later there's a problem, because it means that a general withdrawal would end up splitting Iraq into warring regions, internally stable but in bloody conflict with one another. In addition to the obvious undesirability of this for the people of Iraq, it also would not help much in the War on Terrorism, since al-Qaeda recruiters would be able to point to the corpse of what was once a functional nation and say, "America did this". Another question is what the crime rate is like in Basrah. Few military attacks won't mean much if the region is reduced to mob rule.
Saturday, October 13, 2007
Ramadan bombs rock Afghanistan
On the eastern fringes of Kabul, Abdul Mobin, a doctor, is home early from work, but he cuts a lonely figure as he walks down the hill from his house. Last week his wife and two children died, killed in a suicide attack on a bus taking police officers to work. "Every day they left home 15 minutes before me, every day they said goodbye, my son Munir, on that day, I'm not lying, he said goodbye three or four times. He even came back to the house and said father goodbye." The Taliban claimed responsibility and said it was part of an offensive to mark the holy month of Ramadan.A surge in the number suicide bombings has wracked Afghanistan during Ramadan making it one of the mostly deadly periods in the country since the invasion of foreign troops in 2001. Forty-nine civilians were killed during Ramadan as a result of the Taliban's 'Nasrat' (victory) offensive, according to the Afghan public health ministry. The campaign involved a spate of at least 14 suicide bombings and a series of roadside explosions, most of which were aimed at foreign military as well as Afghan police and army officers. Civilians, however, were among the casualties in almost every attack. Ramadan has seen a distinct shift the type of violence in the Afghan conflict, and there are increasing similarities with the conflict in Iraq.
[More]
Comment:
This is a fairly long article, but one which I strongly recommend reading all of.
The Nasrat offensive, according to the article, indicates, or at least illustrates, a change in the Taliban's strategy. It seems that the war in Afghanistan is becoming less and less of a classical military struggle and more and more of a terrorist insurgency, as is seen in Iraq. In particular, the article notes, attacks have been focusing more on "soft" targets, such as convoys, than more fortified positions. Also, there is a growing "disregard for civilian casualties" — a disregard that may prove costly in the long run, as al-Qaeda has been discovering in Iraq.
I am preparing a map showing the various suicide bombings of the Nasrat offensive. It should be ready later today.
EDIT: There are more technical hang ups than I'd anticipated. In the meantime, here is a simpler map made with Google Earth. I actually quite like it.
[More]
Comment:
This is a fairly long article, but one which I strongly recommend reading all of.
The Nasrat offensive, according to the article, indicates, or at least illustrates, a change in the Taliban's strategy. It seems that the war in Afghanistan is becoming less and less of a classical military struggle and more and more of a terrorist insurgency, as is seen in Iraq. In particular, the article notes, attacks have been focusing more on "soft" targets, such as convoys, than more fortified positions. Also, there is a growing "disregard for civilian casualties" — a disregard that may prove costly in the long run, as al-Qaeda has been discovering in Iraq.
I am preparing a map showing the various suicide bombings of the Nasrat offensive. It should be ready later today.
EDIT: There are more technical hang ups than I'd anticipated. In the meantime, here is a simpler map made with Google Earth. I actually quite like it.
Sunday, September 16, 2007
Iraq tribes vow to avenge murder
Abdul Sattar Abu Risha was leader of the Anbar Salvation Council, an alliance of clans that supported the Iraqi government and US forces in fighting al-Qaeda in the province. An al Qaeda-led group said on Friday it carried out the killing of Abu Risha, according to a posting on a web site.
The Islamic State in Iraq said the killing of Abu Risha was a "heroic operation", but the authenticity of the statement could not be verified. "Allah enabled your brothers ... to track down and assassinate the imam of infidelity and apostasy ... one of the dogs of Bush," said the statement.
Funeral crowd
Thousands of people gathered in Ramadi on Friday to attend Abu Risha's funeral. "We blame al-Qaeda and we are going to continue our fight and avenge his death," Sheikh Ahmed Abu Risha, brother of Abdul Sattar Abu Risha, said on Friday. Ahmed Abu Risha was elected the new leader of the Anbar Salvation Conference just hours after his brother's killing.
Sunni Arab tribes in Anbar, the western Iraqi province, have vowed to avenge the killing of Abdul Sattar Abu Risha, their leader. He died in a roadside-bomb attack near his home in Ramadi, the provincial capital, on Thursday.
Abdul Sattar Abu Risha was leader of the Anbar Salvation Council, an alliance of clans that supported the Iraqi government and US forces in fighting al-Qaeda in the province. An al Qaeda-led group said on Friday it carried out the killing of Abu Risha, according to a posting on a web site.
Pallbearers carried Abdul Sattar Abu Risha's body from Ramadi to the cemetery 10km outside the city, while the funeral procession shouted "revenge, revenge on al-Qaeda." Others mourners chanted "there is no God but Allah and al-Qaeda is the enemy of Allah" and "Abdul Sattar is the pride of Ramadi". Nuri al-Maliki, the Iraqi prime minister, was represented by Muwaffaq al-Rubaie, his national security adviser, who condemned the killing. "It is a national Iraqi disaster. What Abu Risha did for Iraq, no single man has done in the country's history," al-Rubaie told the mourners gathered in the sheikh's house. "We will support Anbar much more than before. Abu Risha is a national hero."
[More]
Comment:
"There is no god but God and al-Qaeda is the enemy of God." That's some pretty powerful rhetoric. For those of you who don't recognize it, that's a variation of a phrase called the Shahada: "There is no god but God and Muhammad is the Prophet of God." The Shahada is the central creed of Islam. To elevate opposition to al-Qaeda to such a level is so extreme that I'm actually somewhat taken aback. In any case, though, I think it's probably safe to say that al-Qaeda's plan for Iraq, as set out in the terrorist text The Management of Savagery and the Zawahri-Zarqawi letter, has failed. The Management of Savagery describes trapping America "in a state of war with the masses of the region"*. However, it is al-Qaeda that has become so entrapped.
This is not the first time this has happened. Back in May, when this blog was just starting out, a group of Uzbek terrorists responded to the Pashtuns' hospitality by assassinating a tribal leader. The Pashtuns responded by completely annihilating the Uzbeks. Apparently, though, al-Qaeda still has not learned that you cannot solve tribal problems simply by smashing them.
According to the article, Abu Risha has become a national hero, along the lines of Ahmad Shah Masoud in Afghanistan. It says that "'His programme now against al-Qaeda has become a national programme. Diyala province, Salahuddin province, Baghdad province are following now his programme.'" It is unfortunate that I was not aware of him prior to his martyrdom, as it would have been an honor to cover his achievements. He was a true hero, and Iraq needs heroes badly in this day and age.
*Funding for this translation was provided by the John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies at Harvard University.
Sunday, July 22, 2007
Bomb kills Iraq Sunni leaders
Five Sunni tribal leaders opposed to al-Qaeda have been killed after a suicide bomber drove a minivan packed with explosives into a house north of Baghdad. The men were meeting in Jurf al-Milih, near Taji, about 20km north of the Iraqi capital, to discuss joining US and Iraqi forces in fighting al-Qaeda.
A police source said another 12 people were wounded in Sunday's attack and the death toll could rise. An Iraqi army source said the tribal chiefs were meeting after talks with local Shia leaders were held in Taji on Friday under the protection of US forces.
Special units
US military commanders have been trying to expand their plan, first used in the violent western province of Anbar, of recruiting local Sunnis who are tired of al-Qaeda violence into special provincial police units. Al-Qaeda is blamed for stoking sectarian hatred and violence between majority Shias and minority Sunni Arabs who were dominant under Saddam Hussein, the former Iraqi leader. The US military began a security crackdown in Baghdad five months ago which initially helped bring down the number of sectarian murders but which also pushed al-Qaeda fighters out of the capital and into surrounding areas. US and Iraqi forces later launched another big operation in the middle of June coinciding with the arrival of the last of 28,000 extra US troops in Iraq.
Via Al Jazeera.
Comment:
This was a rather foolish move on al-Qaeda's part. You'd think that the Uzbek incident of earlier this year would have taught them that it's usually a bad idea, when dealing with tribal peoples, to assassinate their chiefs, especially if their followers are so heavily armed they even carry AK-47s with them in the shower. Al-Qaeda has just ensured the undying enmity of these five clans.
Ironically, al-Qaeda may be one of Iraq's greatest hopes for peace. True, they have done everything in their power to sow discord and calamity, but in doing so, in fighting against all of Iraq, they are slowly uniting the nation against them. Consider the meetings described in the above article. Iraqi Sunnis, talking with Iraqi Shiites? Under the auspices of the US Army? And then going on to another meeting, to discuss joining forces with the government and the Coalition? Much has been made of the need for reconciliation. Isn't that what appears to be happening here?
This is reflected in the numbers. Another Al Jazeera article¹ provides the following statistic: "From July 13 to July 19, 2006, Anbar saw 428 incidents, including small-arm fire, indirect fire, rocker attacks and roadside bomb attacks. In the comparable period this year, that has dropped to 98 incidents." Anbar province, you will remember, is the center of the insurgency, home to Falluja, Ramadi, and Qa'im. Remember, too, that this is during the surge, which has been pushing militants out of the capital. Impressive, isn't it?
A police source said another 12 people were wounded in Sunday's attack and the death toll could rise. An Iraqi army source said the tribal chiefs were meeting after talks with local Shia leaders were held in Taji on Friday under the protection of US forces.
Special units
US military commanders have been trying to expand their plan, first used in the violent western province of Anbar, of recruiting local Sunnis who are tired of al-Qaeda violence into special provincial police units. Al-Qaeda is blamed for stoking sectarian hatred and violence between majority Shias and minority Sunni Arabs who were dominant under Saddam Hussein, the former Iraqi leader. The US military began a security crackdown in Baghdad five months ago which initially helped bring down the number of sectarian murders but which also pushed al-Qaeda fighters out of the capital and into surrounding areas. US and Iraqi forces later launched another big operation in the middle of June coinciding with the arrival of the last of 28,000 extra US troops in Iraq.
Via Al Jazeera.
Comment:
This was a rather foolish move on al-Qaeda's part. You'd think that the Uzbek incident of earlier this year would have taught them that it's usually a bad idea, when dealing with tribal peoples, to assassinate their chiefs, especially if their followers are so heavily armed they even carry AK-47s with them in the shower. Al-Qaeda has just ensured the undying enmity of these five clans.
Ironically, al-Qaeda may be one of Iraq's greatest hopes for peace. True, they have done everything in their power to sow discord and calamity, but in doing so, in fighting against all of Iraq, they are slowly uniting the nation against them. Consider the meetings described in the above article. Iraqi Sunnis, talking with Iraqi Shiites? Under the auspices of the US Army? And then going on to another meeting, to discuss joining forces with the government and the Coalition? Much has been made of the need for reconciliation. Isn't that what appears to be happening here?
This is reflected in the numbers. Another Al Jazeera article¹ provides the following statistic: "From July 13 to July 19, 2006, Anbar saw 428 incidents, including small-arm fire, indirect fire, rocker attacks and roadside bomb attacks. In the comparable period this year, that has dropped to 98 incidents." Anbar province, you will remember, is the center of the insurgency, home to Falluja, Ramadi, and Qa'im. Remember, too, that this is during the surge, which has been pushing militants out of the capital. Impressive, isn't it?
Monday, July 9, 2007
Al-Qaeda threatens war against Iran
The leader of an al-Qaeda umbrella group in Iraq, who was thought to have beeen killed by US forces, has threatened to wage war against Iran unless it stops supporting Shias in Iraq within two months. Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, head of the Islamic State in Iraq, said his Sunni fighters have been preparing to wage a battle against Shia-dominated Iran.
Al-Baghdadi made the announcement in an audiotape that was posted on a web site commonly used by armed groups. The 50-minute audiotape, which was released on Sunday, could not be independently verified.
US forces had earlier claimed to have killed al-Baghdadi. Major General William Caldwell, the commander of the multinational force in Iraq, told a press conference in Baghdad that US forces had killed Muharib Abdulatif al-Juburi on May 1. Brigadier General Abdel Karim Khalaf, operations director at the Iraqi interior minister, told state television that al-Juburi was also known as Abu Omar al-Baghdadi. Audiotape "We are giving the Persians, and especially the rulers of Iran, a two-month period to end all kinds of support for the Iraqi Shia government and to stop direct and indirect intervention ... otherwise a severe war is waiting for you," al-Baghdadi said. Iraq's Shia-led government is backed by the US but closely allied to Iran. The United States accuses Iran of arming and financing Shia militias in Iraq, charges Tehran denies. In the recording, al-Baghdadi also gave Sunnis and Arab countries doing business in Iran or with Iranians a two-month deadline to cease their ties. "We advise and warn every Sunni businessman inside Iran or in Arab countries especially in the Gulf not to take partnership with any Shia Iranian businessman, this is part of the two-month period," he said. Al-Baghdadi said his group was responsible for two suicide truck bomb attacks in May in Iraq's northern Kurdish region. He said the attacks in Irbil and Makhmur showed the "Islamic jihad" was progressing in the Kurdish areas.
Via Al Jazeera.
Comment:
This is an interesting—and somewhat disturbing—development. On the one hand, al-Qaeda launching a war against Iran would do wonders for Iranian-US relations. This silly "I'm not talking to you, so there!" mentality has gone on quite long enough. Also, I doubt there is a doubt in anyone's mind—except the Far Right's—that a war with Iran would completely break the US military. Our army was designed to be able to fight to a standstill on two fronts simultaneously (why it wasn't designed to win on two fronts is something only Rumsfeld knows); three fronts is too many. We need that army for fighting terrorists in Afghanistan, so as much as Bush might like to roll around Khorasan in a tank, blasting away at random buildings, anything that makes peace with Iran more likely is good.
On the other hand, of course, are the repercussions this would have on the people of Iran. First and foremost, being the target of a concerted campaign of terrorist attacks is no fun, in fact it is quite often fatal. Attacks on civilian targets would cause a great many casualties, attacks on Iran's precarious supply of gasoline would greatly exacerbate an already unpleasant situation, attacks on religious targets, such as the Shrine in Mashhad, would even further inflame sectarian tensions across the world, and attacks against cultural landmarks, such as Persepolis or Azadi Tower, could contribute to internal strain between Iranian Persians and Iranian Arabs. Also, as you may have heard, the Iranian government is not exactly benevolent. A war with al-Qaeda would further damage the Iranian democracy, which is already dominated by theocrats and weirdos. Of concern to me personally, the government would also almost certainly use it as an opportunity to ratchet up its persecution of the Bahá'ís. True, the notion of a Bahá'í-al-Qaeda link is so far fetched as to be laughable to the point of hilarity, but common sense has never stood in the mullahs' way before.
Another reason this is somewhat disturbing is that it indicates al-Qaeda in Iraq is trying to get back on course. The original plan was to drive out the British, Americans, and miscellaneous crusading infidels, then use their existing resources and popularity among the pious masses to create an Islamic state, the stability of which the Iraqis would flock to as their world disintegrates around them. Unfortunately for al-Qaeda, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi screwed up that plan by exterminating as many civilians as possible, brutally beheading captive noncombatants, and generally being twisted, maniacal, and evil. By the time Osama and Zawahri woke up to what was happening and exterminated Zarqawi, it was too late, and the pious masses loathed al-Qaeda with a passion. Equally problematic was the rise of the Mahdi Army, which would have been in a far better position to take over as Iraq's de facto government even if it weren't for Big Q's image problem.
Al-Qaeda had been responding to these difficulties via the always effective Ostrich Method, wherein al-Qaeda continued on as though everything was normal, and God sends down a plague of locusts or something to defeat the Mahdi Army and the Coalition. Unfortunately, they now seem to have noticed that God, for whatever reason (and God, verily, has the best of reasons) is failing to come through, so it's up to them to do something constructive. Going after the Mahdi Army's funding by threatening—much less attacking—Iran won't work, as no sane government would give in to a terrorist demand unless it had absolutely no other choice, but I still don't like it that al-Qaeda is beginning to demonstrate some awareness of reality.
Al-Baghdadi made the announcement in an audiotape that was posted on a web site commonly used by armed groups. The 50-minute audiotape, which was released on Sunday, could not be independently verified.
US forces had earlier claimed to have killed al-Baghdadi. Major General William Caldwell, the commander of the multinational force in Iraq, told a press conference in Baghdad that US forces had killed Muharib Abdulatif al-Juburi on May 1. Brigadier General Abdel Karim Khalaf, operations director at the Iraqi interior minister, told state television that al-Juburi was also known as Abu Omar al-Baghdadi. Audiotape "We are giving the Persians, and especially the rulers of Iran, a two-month period to end all kinds of support for the Iraqi Shia government and to stop direct and indirect intervention ... otherwise a severe war is waiting for you," al-Baghdadi said. Iraq's Shia-led government is backed by the US but closely allied to Iran. The United States accuses Iran of arming and financing Shia militias in Iraq, charges Tehran denies. In the recording, al-Baghdadi also gave Sunnis and Arab countries doing business in Iran or with Iranians a two-month deadline to cease their ties. "We advise and warn every Sunni businessman inside Iran or in Arab countries especially in the Gulf not to take partnership with any Shia Iranian businessman, this is part of the two-month period," he said. Al-Baghdadi said his group was responsible for two suicide truck bomb attacks in May in Iraq's northern Kurdish region. He said the attacks in Irbil and Makhmur showed the "Islamic jihad" was progressing in the Kurdish areas.
Via Al Jazeera.
Comment:
This is an interesting—and somewhat disturbing—development. On the one hand, al-Qaeda launching a war against Iran would do wonders for Iranian-US relations. This silly "I'm not talking to you, so there!" mentality has gone on quite long enough. Also, I doubt there is a doubt in anyone's mind—except the Far Right's—that a war with Iran would completely break the US military. Our army was designed to be able to fight to a standstill on two fronts simultaneously (why it wasn't designed to win on two fronts is something only Rumsfeld knows); three fronts is too many. We need that army for fighting terrorists in Afghanistan, so as much as Bush might like to roll around Khorasan in a tank, blasting away at random buildings, anything that makes peace with Iran more likely is good.
On the other hand, of course, are the repercussions this would have on the people of Iran. First and foremost, being the target of a concerted campaign of terrorist attacks is no fun, in fact it is quite often fatal. Attacks on civilian targets would cause a great many casualties, attacks on Iran's precarious supply of gasoline would greatly exacerbate an already unpleasant situation, attacks on religious targets, such as the Shrine in Mashhad, would even further inflame sectarian tensions across the world, and attacks against cultural landmarks, such as Persepolis or Azadi Tower, could contribute to internal strain between Iranian Persians and Iranian Arabs. Also, as you may have heard, the Iranian government is not exactly benevolent. A war with al-Qaeda would further damage the Iranian democracy, which is already dominated by theocrats and weirdos. Of concern to me personally, the government would also almost certainly use it as an opportunity to ratchet up its persecution of the Bahá'ís. True, the notion of a Bahá'í-al-Qaeda link is so far fetched as to be laughable to the point of hilarity, but common sense has never stood in the mullahs' way before.
Another reason this is somewhat disturbing is that it indicates al-Qaeda in Iraq is trying to get back on course. The original plan was to drive out the British, Americans, and miscellaneous crusading infidels, then use their existing resources and popularity among the pious masses to create an Islamic state, the stability of which the Iraqis would flock to as their world disintegrates around them. Unfortunately for al-Qaeda, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi screwed up that plan by exterminating as many civilians as possible, brutally beheading captive noncombatants, and generally being twisted, maniacal, and evil. By the time Osama and Zawahri woke up to what was happening and exterminated Zarqawi, it was too late, and the pious masses loathed al-Qaeda with a passion. Equally problematic was the rise of the Mahdi Army, which would have been in a far better position to take over as Iraq's de facto government even if it weren't for Big Q's image problem.
Al-Qaeda had been responding to these difficulties via the always effective Ostrich Method, wherein al-Qaeda continued on as though everything was normal, and God sends down a plague of locusts or something to defeat the Mahdi Army and the Coalition. Unfortunately, they now seem to have noticed that God, for whatever reason (and God, verily, has the best of reasons) is failing to come through, so it's up to them to do something constructive. Going after the Mahdi Army's funding by threatening—much less attacking—Iran won't work, as no sane government would give in to a terrorist demand unless it had absolutely no other choice, but I still don't like it that al-Qaeda is beginning to demonstrate some awareness of reality.
Saturday, June 9, 2007
For U.S. Unit in Baghdad, An Alliance of Last Resort
BAGHDAD, June 8 -- The worst month of Lt. Col. Dale Kuehl's deployment in western Baghdad was finally drawing to a close. The insurgent group al-Qaeda in Iraq had unleashed bombings that killed 14 of his soldiers in May, a shocking escalation of violence for a battalion that had lost three soldiers in the previous six months while patrolling the Sunni enclave of Amiriyah. On top of that, the 41-year-old battalion commander was doubled up with a stomach flu when, late on May 29, he received a cellphone call that would change everything.
"We're going after al-Qaeda," a leading local imam said, Kuehl recalled. "What we want you to do is stay out of the way."
Comment:
It really is scary just how fool-proof al-Qaeda's plan was. The one weak point was al-Qaeda's belief that since their goal was so lofty, they could do no wrong (Bush seems to have a similar attitude). They would have succeeded if they had been on God's side in deed as well as in word; as it is, their evil actions prevented the populace from rising up and embracing them, and the plan fell apart.
Thanks to vermontdave for pointing me to this article.
"We're going after al-Qaeda," a leading local imam said, Kuehl recalled. "What we want you to do is stay out of the way."
[More]
Comment:
It really is scary just how fool-proof al-Qaeda's plan was. The one weak point was al-Qaeda's belief that since their goal was so lofty, they could do no wrong (Bush seems to have a similar attitude). They would have succeeded if they had been on God's side in deed as well as in word; as it is, their evil actions prevented the populace from rising up and embracing them, and the plan fell apart.
Thanks to vermontdave for pointing me to this article.
Friday, April 13, 2007
Leader of 1920 Revolution Brigades Killed by al-Qaeda
By Lydia Khalil
The 1920 Revolution Brigades recently announced the death of its leader, Harith Dhahir Khamis al-Dari, nephew and namesake of Harith al-Dari, the exiled head of the Muslim Scholars Association. The 1920 Revolution Brigades is one of the largest indigenous Iraqi insurgent groups, but after al-Dari's death, the Brigades announced its split into two factions (the 1920 Revolution Brigades and Hamas-Iraq). The break was the result of differing viewpoints on working with the al-Anbar Salvation Council, negotiating with coalition forces and the relationship vis-à-vis al-Qaeda's Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) (Terrorism Focus, March 27). Al-Dari was reportedly long targeted by al-Qaeda for his refusal to pledge allegiance to Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, amir of the ISI, and was finally killed by an al-Qaeda ambush on March 27.
According to the internet release of the "al-Jihad al-Islami Corps" of the 1920 Revolution Brigades on March 27, its "valiant leader, Harith Dhahir Khamis al-Dari, fell today immersed in his chaste blood during his battlefield jihad in Abu Ghraib sector. He was in charge of jihad and of fighting the enemy in that sector. He was targeted this morning in a treacherous ambush while returning to his house after inspecting one of the operations grounds." There have been recent reports that the 1920 Revolution Brigades, and al-Dari in particular, were about to link up with the al-Anbar Salvation Council, although spokesmen for the 1920 Revolution Brigades strongly deny that a final deal had been struck. Leaders within the group, however, confirmed to Arab newspapers that this was the cause of the rift within the organization and the cause of al-Dari's death.
Al-Dari is not the only insurgent leader who has been targeted by al-Qaeda. In addition to stepping up their propaganda campaign promoting the ISI, al-Qaeda has been actively engaged in assassinations and targeted bombings against Iraqi Sunni tribes who do not comply. According to al-Hayat, militants from various factions stated that al-Qaeda has killed 30 members of the 1920 Revolution Brigades and the Islamic Army (al-Hayat, March 31).
Aggressive al-Qaeda tactics to take control of the Iraqi insurgency are placing indigenous Iraqi insurgent groups in an increasingly difficult position. Members of indigenous militant groups have complained that al-Qaeda has distorted the resistance and fomented sectarian conflict. Abu Hudhayfah, a commander within the 1920 Revolution Brigades, complained, "al-Qaeda's assassination of Harith Zahir al-Dari…has left resistance groups with two options: either to fight al-Qaeda and negotiate with the Americans, or fight the Americans and join the Islamic State of Iraq, which divides Iraq. Both options are bitter" (al-Hayat, March 31).
Since Iraqi insurgent leaders are aware that their conflict with al-Qaeda detracts from their fight against the occupation, they have taken pains to point out that al-Dari's assassination had nothing to do with his purported cooperation with the government and that it was solely due to his stance against al-Qaeda. Tribal members are keen on maintaining his jihadi credentials. When his cousin, the spokesman of the Muslim Scholars Association Muthana Harith al-Dari, was interviewed by al-Jazeera regarding his death, he noted that "the government's news media [is trying to] give another reason for the assassination by claiming that Harith al-Dari was killed because of the Zubaei tribe…cooperating with the Iraqi government…the truth is completely different…The Zubaei tribe is a jihadist tribe which fought against the occupation and its agents. It will never deviate from this course…[al-Dari] was targeted because he was one of the leaders of the armed resistance in the Abu Ghraib area" (al-Jazeera, March 27).
His uncle, Harith al-Dari, head of the Muslim Scholars Association, has thus far not commented on the death of his nephew. He previously had come out against members of his own tribe for working against al-Qaeda and negotiating with the Iraqi government and coalition forces (al-Safir, March 24). The senior al-Dari is still outside of Iraq, shuttling between various Middle Eastern countries (Terrorism Monitor, December 14, 2006).
Via Terrorism Focus.
The 1920 Revolution Brigades recently announced the death of its leader, Harith Dhahir Khamis al-Dari, nephew and namesake of Harith al-Dari, the exiled head of the Muslim Scholars Association. The 1920 Revolution Brigades is one of the largest indigenous Iraqi insurgent groups, but after al-Dari's death, the Brigades announced its split into two factions (the 1920 Revolution Brigades and Hamas-Iraq). The break was the result of differing viewpoints on working with the al-Anbar Salvation Council, negotiating with coalition forces and the relationship vis-à-vis al-Qaeda's Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) (Terrorism Focus, March 27). Al-Dari was reportedly long targeted by al-Qaeda for his refusal to pledge allegiance to Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, amir of the ISI, and was finally killed by an al-Qaeda ambush on March 27.
According to the internet release of the "al-Jihad al-Islami Corps" of the 1920 Revolution Brigades on March 27, its "valiant leader, Harith Dhahir Khamis al-Dari, fell today immersed in his chaste blood during his battlefield jihad in Abu Ghraib sector. He was in charge of jihad and of fighting the enemy in that sector. He was targeted this morning in a treacherous ambush while returning to his house after inspecting one of the operations grounds." There have been recent reports that the 1920 Revolution Brigades, and al-Dari in particular, were about to link up with the al-Anbar Salvation Council, although spokesmen for the 1920 Revolution Brigades strongly deny that a final deal had been struck. Leaders within the group, however, confirmed to Arab newspapers that this was the cause of the rift within the organization and the cause of al-Dari's death.
Al-Dari is not the only insurgent leader who has been targeted by al-Qaeda. In addition to stepping up their propaganda campaign promoting the ISI, al-Qaeda has been actively engaged in assassinations and targeted bombings against Iraqi Sunni tribes who do not comply. According to al-Hayat, militants from various factions stated that al-Qaeda has killed 30 members of the 1920 Revolution Brigades and the Islamic Army (al-Hayat, March 31).
Aggressive al-Qaeda tactics to take control of the Iraqi insurgency are placing indigenous Iraqi insurgent groups in an increasingly difficult position. Members of indigenous militant groups have complained that al-Qaeda has distorted the resistance and fomented sectarian conflict. Abu Hudhayfah, a commander within the 1920 Revolution Brigades, complained, "al-Qaeda's assassination of Harith Zahir al-Dari…has left resistance groups with two options: either to fight al-Qaeda and negotiate with the Americans, or fight the Americans and join the Islamic State of Iraq, which divides Iraq. Both options are bitter" (al-Hayat, March 31).
Since Iraqi insurgent leaders are aware that their conflict with al-Qaeda detracts from their fight against the occupation, they have taken pains to point out that al-Dari's assassination had nothing to do with his purported cooperation with the government and that it was solely due to his stance against al-Qaeda. Tribal members are keen on maintaining his jihadi credentials. When his cousin, the spokesman of the Muslim Scholars Association Muthana Harith al-Dari, was interviewed by al-Jazeera regarding his death, he noted that "the government's news media [is trying to] give another reason for the assassination by claiming that Harith al-Dari was killed because of the Zubaei tribe…cooperating with the Iraqi government…the truth is completely different…The Zubaei tribe is a jihadist tribe which fought against the occupation and its agents. It will never deviate from this course…[al-Dari] was targeted because he was one of the leaders of the armed resistance in the Abu Ghraib area" (al-Jazeera, March 27).
His uncle, Harith al-Dari, head of the Muslim Scholars Association, has thus far not commented on the death of his nephew. He previously had come out against members of his own tribe for working against al-Qaeda and negotiating with the Iraqi government and coalition forces (al-Safir, March 24). The senior al-Dari is still outside of Iraq, shuttling between various Middle Eastern countries (Terrorism Monitor, December 14, 2006).
Via Terrorism Focus.
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